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Abstract
In the not-so-distant past, space access and air/space technology superiority were within the purview of the U.S. and
former Soviet Union's respective space agencies, both vying for global leadership in space exploitation. In more
recent years, with the emergence of the European Space Agency (ESA) member countries and Asian countries
joining the family of space-faring nations, it is truer now more than ever that space access and utilization has
become a truly global enterprise. In fact, according to the Space Report 2007, this enterprise is a $251-billion
economy.
It is possible to gauge the vitality of worldwide efforts from open sources in today's transparent, media-based
society. In particular, print and web broadcasters regularly report and catalog global space activities for defense and
civil purposes. For the purposes of this paper, a representative catalog of missions is used to illustrate the nature of
the emerging "globalization." This paper highlights global trends in terms of not only the providers of space access,
but also the end-users for the various recently accomplished missions. With well over 50 launches per year, in recent
years, the launch-log reveals a surprising percentage of "cooperative or co-dependent missions" where different
agencies, countries, and/or commercial entities are so engaged presumably to the benefit of all who participate.
Statistics are cited and used to show that recently over d0% of the 50-plus missions involved multiple nations
working collectively to deliver payloads to orbit. Observers, space policy professionals, and space agency leaders
have eloquently proposed that it might require the combined resources and talents of multiple nations to advance
human exploration goals beyond low earth orbit. This paper does not intend to offer new information with respect to
whether international collaboration is necessary but to observe that, in continuing to monitor global trends, the
results seem to support the thesis that a global interdependent effort with all its likely complexities is an increasingly
viable and pragmatic option.
The discussion includes a breakdown of space missions into those of civil (scientific), military, and strictly
commercial nature. It concludes that all three are robust components of a globally diversified portfolio of activities
relying, essentially, on a common space industrial base and space infrastructure. As in other industries, the
distribution of space industry assets and knowledge across countries and continents enables a diverse suite of
options and arrangements, particularly in the areas of civil and commercial space utilization. A survey of several
ongoing bilateral and multilateral space collaboration examples are provided to augment the observations regarding
multinational work in space.
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Staff Engineer, CPIAC, 10630 Little Patuxent Pkwy., Suite 202, Senior Member,
Deputy Director, CPIAC, 10630 Little Patuxent Pkwy., Suite 202, Senior Member.
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L INTRODUCTION
Fifty years after the formal inception of the
U.S. civil space program, it is appropriate to recount
the prescient words of President Dwight D.
Eisenhower leading up to the NASA Authorization
Act of 1958. In his March 26 statement on
"Introduction to Outer Space," the President stated to
the country, and essentially to the world:
"(There are) many,
 aspects of space and
space technology ... which can be helpful to all
people as the United States proceeds with its peaceful
program in space science and exploration. Every
person has the opportunity to share through
understanding in the adventures which lie ahead."
"This statement [ .... J makes clear the
opportunities which a developing space technology
can provide to extend man's knowledge of the earth,
the solar system, and the universe. These
opportunities reinforce my conviction that we and
other nations have a great responsibility to promote
the peaceful use of space and to utilize the new
knowledge obtainable from space science and
technology for the benefit of all mankind" '
There is much evidence today that Eisenhower's
prognostication has home out. While this former
General is known for having coined the term
Military-Industrial-Complex (MIC), he is less well
known for his seminal contribution to the dawn of
Human Space Flight and the civil space program.
Both aspects of President Eisenhower's
forecast are at play in the twenty-first century. The
purpose of this paper, however, is to show that the
first aspect--civil and commercial space--might
become the dominant aspect to influence and shape a
worldwide space science industry devoted to meeting
the evolving needs of humankind.
Once Sputnik deorbited in January 1958,
more than 50 years ago, the U.S. and the former
Soviet Union were investing heavily in civil space
efforts, which some believe was a proxy investment
toward military space ends. Following the
superpowers' race to the moon, a period of
retrenchment followed, which gave an opportunity
for other parties to enter the space flight arena. Thus,
the first significant multinational space collaboration
efforts began in the form of the European Space
Agency (ESA) in 1974-- 35 years ago--with 6 nations
and is now comprised of as many as 17 member
nations.
The success of ESA following the success of
the U.S. and former U.S.S.R. motivated Asian
nations to institute long-term indigenous space
technology efforts for both space access and
utilization. Today, space access into low earth orbit
(LEO) is available to virtually any nation willing to
purchase a launch, and competitively offered by more
than eight nations who are able to provide a launch
vehicle for LEO payload delivery. Launch suppliers
today include: U.S., Russia, Ukraine, China, Japan,
India, ESA-member countries (France/'Germany etc.),
and several additional nations following closely
behind with their own government-sponsored launch
vehicles.
Today, worldwide launch rates are
appreciable and sustained. Unbeknownst to most of
the public, there is a major launch to earth orbit
(ETO) essentially every week of the year. ETO
launch missions may be placed into one of three
categories: those for strictly military purposes, those
for scientific purposes, and those for commercial
needs; hereafter referred to as military, civil, and
commercial space applications. It is worth noting that
the mix of missions among the three major types is
shifting toward an increased diversity of missions,
sponsors, and providers. In looking closer at this mix,
we are able to identify noteworthy trends about an
emerging international industrial base for space
products and services.
II. SPACE LAUNCH DATABASE
Industry observers are paying close attention
to launch activity worldwide and the corresponding
missions in order to accurately report their findings to
a vibrant marketplace for space products and
services. Figure I is an excerpt from a report by
Futron Corp. provided as an example. 2This study
indicated a fairly stable level of ETO launch activity
in the beginning of the twenty-first century at sixty
launches per year with approximately one-third being
of the commercial (non-government) type. The actual
number of launches is 55 for the years 2004 and
2005.
Figure 1. ETO Launches worldwide by type, 2001-
2005 (reproduced with permission from 2004
report by Futron Corp, see Ref. 2).
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The Aerospace Corporation, a federally-funded, not-
for-profit research and development center (FFRDC)
in the U.S., also tracks launch activity and analyzes
success rates of launch systems in detail, such as in
the comprehensive Ref. 3 study, and their causes.
Notable examples of media observers also
exist. For the purpose of this paper, multiple publicly
sources were consulted, including Spaceflight Now's
Launch Log and The Space Launch Report."' The
logs were compared for accuracy and formed the
basis of the log used for this work, the CPIAC
6Launch Log. The data were further refined to
include only successful launches of orbital satellites
in order to reflect space utilization and not attempted
utilization of space. An inspection of the launch log
is informative in that it reflects top-level essential
details of the mission such as the type of launch
vehicle, the name of the payload(s), the location of
the launch site, and the actual launch date/time,
among other facts and figures. Whereas each launch
event is a remarkable achievement in itself, the
composite of information over multiple years can be
quite instructive, for it gives insights into global
trends in the space marketplace. The followin g two
examples may illustrate the database's utility.
In the past decade it was expected that
commercial technology needs would spur sustained
demand for space launches for communications
satellites. The launch log in Ref. 4 allows a multi-
year review of such payloads since each mission
payload is given. It was further expected that in the
twenty-first century new launch providers and end-
users would enter a market originally dominated in
both supply and demand by the U.S. and the former
Soviet Union in a bipolar twentieth century.
The database today reflects a global space
marketplace, where end-users benefit by having a
choice of launch providers at varying levels of risk
and cost. Evidence of various types of collaborative
arrangements between and among governments,
international corporations, and private-public
arrangements are found as well. As an anecdotal
example, consider the comanifested Thai and
Mexican payloads--launched on an Ariane vehicle
(by ESA of Europe)--from the South American island
site of Kourou in French Guiana (mission on 27 May
2006). Although at first glance this may seem to be
an exceptional case, further review reveals many
examples of bilateral/multilateral missions; such
missions seem to be almost as common as the single-
nation "indigenously conducted" missions.
The following discussion describes an "as-
is" state for global space access and makes specific
observations by deriving information from 2004 to
2008, the period for which the launch log was posted.
We begin by noting the various launch vehicles that
comprise today's "operational global fleet," including
their corresponding launch sites, and then note the
types of payloads from various countries around the
world that paid for access to space. Suborbital
missions are excluded in this discussion since, for our
purposes, "access to space" means achieving enough
kinetic energy so as to sustain a payload for at least a
few completed earth orbits, if not a mission duration
of several years.
111. SPACE LAUNCH INFRASTRUCTURE
AND ACTIVITY
ETO launch providers include governments
and corporations located on three of the seven
continents of the world (North America, Europe, and
Asia), and are the product of aggressive R&D from
national space agencies. Both new and derivative
models of launchers have evolved according to
individual nation's space policiesi'strategies. Their
respective launch sites are located around the globe--
on land, coastal areas, and even on the ocean itself. A
review of this diversity of capability is an integral
part of understanding global trends.
Figure 2 shows the ETO launch vehicles
employed for the missions given in the launch log.
This set of active launchers is surprisingly a modest
fraction of the historical family of earth-to-orbit
launchers referred to in Ref. 3 and described in more
detail by Isakowitz in Ref. 7. In order to facilitate
comparison, the vehicles are shown approximately to
scale, categorized by space powers, in approximate
order of vehicle stack height. The Soviet space
pro gram derived launchers include the current
versions known as Rokot, Proton, Zenit, Soyuz,
Molniya, Tsyklon, Kosmos, Dnepr, Shtil', Volna, and
Start-1. The current U.S. launcher fleet includes the
Delta 2, the Medium, Intermediate, and Heavy-lift
Delta 4, the Medium and Intermediate Atlas V, the
Space Shuttle, Pegasus, Taurus, and Minotaur. A new
and remarkable third group includes the operating
launchers Ariane 5, Long March, H2A, M-5, PSLV,
GSLV, and their variants, which have demonstrated
payload delivery to ETO multiple times. Retired and
sporadically used launchers are omitted-, examples
would include the U.S. Titan family of rockets, as
well as earlier Delta, Atlas, Ariane, and other
boosters such as the Soviet shuttle Buran.
In addition to the active launch vehicles
(LV), a new suite of boosters is under development;
examples include the Ares boosters, Falcon I and
Falcon 9, Taurus 2, Angara, Vega, and others that
have been openly promoted for ETO use. The
demonstrated reliability of the new active launchers
is imperfect but maturing. 3 Nevertheless, the sheer
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number of variations of ETO-capable vehicles
provides the launch customer with an array of options
for payload delivery, covering a range of risk and
cost tradeoffs.
Figure 3 illustrates the launch sites for the
active launch vehicles, focusing on sites used during
the period from 2004 to 2008. The suborbital launch
sites are omitted, unless an actual orbital launch
occurred from that location, e.g., Wallops Flight
Facility (WFF) on the Eastern seaboard of the U.S.
The workhorse launch sites exist within the
continental U.S. and the former Soviet bloc countries.
The latter will henceforth be referred to as
Commonwealth of Independent States or CIS (post-
USSR). In the U.S., Cape Canaveral Air Force
Station (CCAFS) conducts many military launches
and also hosts NASA's Kennedy Space Center (KSC)
launch sites. Vandenberg Air Force Base (V AFB)
continues to be active as well. The CIS' analogous
sites are the Plesetsk and Baikonur cosmodromes, but
the Dombarovsky site, the Svobodny site (limited
use), and the Barents Sea (submarine) launch
capabilities continue to serve as well. Commercial
launch sites have also been added to the group,
namely, Kwajalein--the Odyssey ocean launch
platform--and Wallops Flight Facility, which was
originally a suborbital launch site.
The Sea Launch Odyssey platform is an
interesting case. The platform itself is owned and
operated by Sea Launch, a multi-national
corporation; it was converted from a Japanese oil
platform into a floating launch site by a Norwegian
company .24 However, as Odyssey's home port is in
California and Sea Launch operations are managed
primarily by the Boeing Company, for the purposes
of this paper Odyssey will be considered a U.S.
launch site.
The emerging capabilities and activities for
space access in non-US and non-CIS countries have
increased greatly in the past two decades. Launch
sites are a good indication of this, as the following
seven sites that have been consistently active for the
period of 2004-2008 of the launch log: China
(Jiuqian, Taiyuan, Xichang), India (Sriharikota),
Japan (Tanegashima, Uchinoura), and ESA (Kourou).
Taken together one can see that the Northern
Hemisphere is dotted with launch sites from the
equator to the northern latitudes of the Barents Sea,
and circumscribe the globe along the latitudes near
the Tropic of Cancer. Coastal sites seem to be
preferred, however, as China and Russia have shown,
land launch sites are just as common. Several new
launch sites for LEO access may become viable over
the next decade as countries with nascent missile
capabilities convert them to better performing larger
vehicles for orbital payload delivery. Private
launchers are also in development, though not
addressed here.
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Figure 2. Depictions of most Earth-to-orbit launch vehicles used in recent years (scale is
relative/approximate); various additional derivatives exist but are not shown for brevity.
S
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
Figure 3. Launch sites employed for space access (from 2004 to 2008) by established worldwide providers of E'TO launch services.
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Given the proliferation of ETO launch
capability, a measure of worldwide space access is
the number of mission conducted with these assets.
Figure 4 compares the number of missions conducted
by the U.S. and CIS with those of the newer space-
faring nations. There has been a steady rise of
missions by the emerging space-faring nations. The
combined activities of China, India, Japan, and ESA
have led to 21 missions conducted in 2008, versus
only 12 in 2004. At an annual global rate of
approximately 50 to 65 missions per year, the
fraction of missions conducted by emerging space-
faring nations has surged from 23 percent to 33
percent in a period of only 4 years. The numbers of
payloads actually being lofted into orbit is greater
than the number of missions/launches by a significant
amount, as shown in Table 1. This is due to payload
co-manifesting (double or triple occupancy).
Unlike the data presented in Ref. 3, the
recent, high success rates of newer space launch
vehicles are attractive to prospective global users
(commercial and government), making the newer
launchers more competitive with the U.S. and CIS.
Figure 4. Worldwide space missions: Traditional
versus Emerging ETO launches.
faring nations is meant to include the following types
of bilateral or multilateral arrangements involvin g the
launch pad, the LV, and the spacecraft (SIC): a) Both
LV and launch pad from one nation, and one or more
SIC by other nation(s); b) both LV and S ' , I C by a one
nation, and the launch pad in and by another nation;
or c) the launch pad of one nation and the LV and
one or more S/C of another nation. Scenario C,
though unusual, became possible upon the break-tip of
the Soviet Union (Kazakhstan of CIS having the
launch pad), and applies also to Kourou, the primary
provider of ESA's launch facilities. While there may
be certain unusual permutations in the gray area (e.g.,
SeaLaunch Corp's use of a platform on the Pacific
Ocean, and CIS submarine launches from Barents
Sea), the above approach satisfies the analysis
objectives of this work.
Collaborative 'multi-party" missions
account for more than one-third of all the combined
missions from 2004 to 2008. (The arrangements are
varied and worthy of more detailed discussion,
though beyond the scope of this paper). It is safe to
assume that these collaborations are now considered
more the "norm" than the exception. Since most
military missions are performed within the purview
of a single nation with vested national interest in
mission success-- many scientific missions are this
way also--most of the collaborative/cooperative
missions tend to be a result of commercially-based
motivations.
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Table 1. Missions and Payloads to ETO.
20041 2005 2006 2007 2008
Space
51 52 62 63 65
Launches
Payloads
Lofted 57 62 67 79 71
Figure 5 presents data on worldwide space
missions from 2004 to 2008 in terms of the amount
of collaboration among nations, whether agencies orZ^
private-public entities. For the forthcoming
discussion, collaboration among two or more space
2004	 2005	 2006	 2007	 2008
Figure 5. Collaborative missions requiring multi-
nation space infrastructure versus single-nation
infrastructure for ETO payloads.
A representative example would be the
following 2006 mission: a CIS Zenit booster,
launched from the Pacific Odyssey ocean platform,
carrying an American-built payload for Japan'
Another example is the European Ariane 5 launcher
delivering both a Thai and a Mexican satellite from
its South America Kourou launch site. The
involvement of 3 or 4 nations, with quite
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a) Launch Vehicle Types by source
17 US
EMS
n Emerging
OUS
E CIS
^ P ^ erging
geographically dispersed assets, is not unusual of
late. It would be interesting to develop a
collaboration index specifying the degree of
multilateralism involved in the missions (number of
nations involved say), however this is deferred for
future work.
A complementary metric to Figs. 4 and 5 is
the comparison of ETO missions with a single-
payload manifest to those missions with a multi-
payload manifest, Fig. 6. According to the launch-
log, single-occupancy payloads still dominate space
launch manifests. There is, however, a trend of
increasing multi-payload manifests. Figure 7 shows
that the number of countries launching these types of
missions is increasing.
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Figure 6. Comparison of space launches delivering
single-payload versus co-manifested multi-nation
payloads.
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Figure 7. Space faring groups which have
performed missions with co-manifested multi-
nation payloads.
and b. Despite a less diverse LV fleet, the latter
group operates many launch sites.
b) Launch Sites by source
Figure 8. Launch vehicle types (a) and launch sites
(b) around the globe.
Table 2 summarizes information about
launches/mission conducted by the U.S., CIS, and
emerging space-faring nations, as reflected in Ref. 3.
The missions conducted by ESA are denoted
separately in the table, though included under
"emerging" capabilities in Figure 4. This grouping is
somewhat subjective and debatable, given that ESA
launches and missions date from the 1980s. For the
purpose of this paper, non-U.S. and non-CIS nations
are grouped together to better compare their space
activity in relation to the two nations involved in the
1960s space race.
The distribution of ETO launch vehicles and
associated launch sites among the U.S., CIS, and
emerging space-faring nations is illustrated in Fig. 8a
8
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Table 2. Worldwide Launches by Grou 3.
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
USA 17 16 22 17 I8
CIS ("former 22 23 23 25 26
USSR")
ESA 3 5 5 6 6
(`Europe")
Asia (India, 9 8 12 15 15
China,
Japan)
TOT = 51 52	 1 62 63 65
Note: Emerging space faring nations are considered
here to be non-U.S. and non-CIS nations, namely
ESA group of countries-- India, China, and Japan.
An indication of interest in space utilization
is possible by examining where the payloads are from
internationally (Figure 9). This is estimated directly
from the launch-log database of 2004-2008. Payloads
from North America are the most numerous, with
U.S. supplying 102 payloads, 7 from Canada and
Mexico, and 5 from South America. The Asian
countries, collectively, built or commissioned 92
payloads, while Europe built or commissioned 50.
The CIS payloads numbered 76, while Australia and
African countries supplied 2 each.
C—L, A­ fr. H-
Eu
-Us
^. 7
Figure 9. Worldwide interest in space utilization
in terms of spacecrafts launched globally.
The space access marketplace is now a
subject of great interest commercially and
strategically for both the public and private sectors. s-
11 The following sections of this paper highlight some
trends found in this marketplace, as noted in open
media sources.
IV. FACTORS INFLUENCING
COLLABORATION
If the advent of ballistic missiles ushered in
the dawning of the Space Age, then it can be
hypothesized that the globalization of space products
and services (government and commercial) will be a
signature of a new space era ahead. Despite setbacks
due to the challenging nature of missions, the
increase in worldwide space capability and
infrastructure does not go unnoticed by governments,
corporate enthusiasts, and the mass media; a
representative example of each may be seen in Refs.
12, 13, and 14, respectively. Perspectives vary
according to interests and are sometimes overly
optimistic regarding potential synergies of
transnational collaboration, and other times
protectionist.
Perspectives aside;
 it is expedient to identify
collaboration and cooperation ventures as either
bilateral or multilateral, and consisting of
government-to-government agreements, private-
sector agreements across national borders, and
combinations of governments and private companies
as permissible by national authorities. The particulars
of the arrangements are not within the scope of this
paper; however, what is of interest here is the fact
that a multitude of both public and private entities are
indeed able to reach across national boundaries to
serve a global client base.
A. Economic Incentives for Cooperation
Commercial activity spawns an inter-
dependent approach to space access and space
utilization. The amount of this activity is measured in
the 2008 Space Report by the Space Foundation .' In
particular, it identifies $251 billion of global space
revenue for 2007 worldwide. Remarkably, only 31%-
-$77 billion--was attributable to government space
budgets of the U.S. and other international
government investments in space activity, which
includes military space. The remaining $174 billion
was commercial revenue. The launch industry
revenue portion is reported at $3 billion annually,
which seems a modest enabling investment by
comparison .9 The Space Foundation Index (SFI), an
index of activity, has increased from a value of 100 in
mid-2005, to 130 by year-end 2007, which is
consistent with the trends in the previous section.
While commercially-developed and -
operated space transportation services are still
limited, the users of such services are abundant and
satellite builders have tapped into a strong satellite
communications market. The 2008 Space Report
gives the values of $65 billion and $56 billion for
direct-to-home television service and global
positioning (GPS) applications services, respectively.
As long as there is a high demand for global satellite
communications, the spacecraft constellations will
require periodic replenishments and upgrades, thus
o US
0 (Von-US NA
o Cis
o Asia
® Europe
o South
America
D Australia
Africa
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sustaining a predictable market for launch providers
to make the necessary constellation visits.
For the years 2004 to 2008, a large number
of communications spacecraft were completed and
delivered to orbit. The referenced launch-logs note
that a variety of launch providers were utilized,
including various U.S., CIS, and more recently, the
emerging Asian nations' launchers.
It also is noteworthy that the commercial
satellite business is historically rooted in the
formation of Intelsat, an inter-governmental
organization that was created to provide global
satellite communications. In 2001, Intelsat was
privatized into a multi-national corporation, and is
one of the largest operators of satellites, with over 50
satellites in operation today_
B. Shared Vision for Space Utilization
National space agencies typically maintain a
strategic roadmap spanning a decade or two for their
investments in non-military space. Non-U.S. national
agencies, such as the European Union and Japan,
maintain openly published roadmaps, often available
on their Web sites. Conference proceedings openly
document this type of information. 1Q For several
years, the U.S. focused its civil space efforts on the
2005 Vision for Space Exploration (VSE). The U.S.
VSE as released in 2005 envisioned a continuous
human presence in space on-board the International
Space Station (ISS), and also a lunar outpost in the
2020s. The EU intends to develop its own capabilities
to send humans to orbit, and later to the moon, during
the next two decades. Japan's space roadmap
articulates a strong focus on societal benefits first and
subsequently leads to goals and timeframes for
human space access capability.
Such strategic plans are comparable or
analogous in terms of certain goals or timeframes.
For instance, in the specific case of Earth observation
missions of remote sensing, in which all major
national space agencies have an interest. A
transparent internet-based media environment
facilitates the exchange of information among
national space agencies and both independent and
collaborative planning for space. The Space 2008
Report summarizes some of this transnational
collaboration and developing cooperation and
collaboration is discussed in the Global Exploration
Strategy Report, Framework for Coordination. 14 The
framework document-- summarizing the perspectives
from space agencies of 14 nations--calls for the
establishment of a formal voluntary non-binding
mechanism by which space agencies can exchange
information and coordinate activities and plans for
their respective space exploration goals. Such a
coordination mechanism would play a defining role
in helping multiple space programs around the globe
to move forward in concert and identify gaps,
overlaps, and synergies along the way.
According to a NASA press release, "the
framework document is an important step in an
evolving process toward a comprehensive global
approach to space exploration. Although the
framework document is non-binding, its contents are
consistent with ongoing bilateral and multilateral
discussions that would lead to cooperative
agreements for specific projects. In addition to
NASA, representatives from civil space agencies in
Australia, Canada, China, the European Union,
France, Germany, Great Britain, India, Italy, Japan,
Russia, the Republic of Korea and Ukraine
participated in the Global Exploration Strategy
discussions." 14 The member agencies include ASI
(Italy), BNSC (UK), CNES (France), CNSA (China),
CSA (Canada), CSIRO (Australia), DLR (Germany),
ESA (Europe), ISRO (India), JAXA (Japan), KARI
(South Korea), NASA (U.S.), NSAU (Ukraine), and
Roscosmos (Russia). Many of the countries involved
have developed an independent or inter-dependent
(cooperative) viable space access infrastructure.
Thus, at least both national economic and national
strategic motives are expected to facilitate the
globalization of space, and collaboration in
particular. In Ref. 16, Hudiberg makes well-
supported observations after examining several
decades of NASA's various types of collaboration
agreements. Essentially, in categorizing hundreds of
NASA collaborations over its entire history,
Hudiberg finds that both policy and technology
readiness can incentivize (or disineentivize) the U.S.
space agency to collaborate across national borders.
A marked decline in the number of collaborations
was observed beyond the late 80s, which correlated
strongly with increasing complexity or maturity of
NASA projects where perhaps external relationships
were perceived as making technology management
more difficult. The ISS is a notable exception.
Reference 17 reports on a special global space
cooperation meeting (among high level government
officials), where the desire for more integration
among space-faring nations was discussed. Riess,
Popp, and Ryzenko discuss space globalization at a
tactical level with programmatic case studies. where
all argue in favor of global space cooperation and
knowledge sharing. 11-21
Additional factors that may drive
collaboration include the collateral benefits of space
technology that accrue toward military and political
goals, however, these are excluded from the scope of
this paper and may be studied in the future. Instead,
the remaining discussion presents some selected
10
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examples of transnational space collaboration in
order to better appreciate the many varieties of
collaborative relationships in space ventures. The
following examples are taken from mass media
reports and may be broadly categorized into one of
two types of collaboration (among space agencies):
either bilateral or multi-lateral. The intent is simply to
survey, rather than analyze, the examples as
representative of demonstrated successes in the
international space arena, and therefore templates for
future ventures.
Bilateral space collaboration often occurs among
nations that are otherwise expected to be competitors
in political arenas and/or are geographically and
culturally separated. For instance:
• China and Brazil: Earth Resources Satellites (at
Least three spacecraft), known as CBERS ., since
1988.
• China and France:	 Sino-French	 Joint
Commission on Space Cooperation, since 2003.
• Russia and China: The "Cooperative Agreement
between the China National Space
Administration and the Russian Space Agency
on joint Chinese-Russian exploration of Mars,"
in March 2007.
• U.S. and India: Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) of 2006 regarding US instruments to be
carried on Indian robotic lunar spacecraft
Chandrayaan-1; this mission just completed in
2009.
• Russia and EU: Agreement in 2008 to cooperate
on a future manned vessel for transporting
astronauts to the moon.
• Russia and U.S.: Joint venture known as
International Launch Services (ILS),,providing
either U.S. (Atlas) or Russian (Proton) launch
vehicles, since 1995.
Multi-lateral collaboration is as varied in purpose as
it is in participation, as evident below:
• Sixteen nations (12 European, 2 American, I
Asian, and Russia): Working together to build
and operate the U.S.-led International Space
Station, over the past two decades.
• Three nations: Corporate collaboration among
U.S., Russian, and Norwegian companies to
provide equatorial-latitude based launches, since
1995.
• Multi-national Corporation: Corporations in
which operations are spread across national
boundaries. Examples such as Intelsat deploying
and operating a global network of spacecraft for
worldwide instant communications needs, since
1964.
Twelve (national) space agencies: Selected
member subgroup of the United Nations Charter
on Cooperation to Achieve the Coordinated Use
of Space (UNCOPUOS) facilities in the event of
natural or technological disasters, since 2000;
there are a total of 69 nation members of
UNCOPUOS.
Eight countries (two North American, four
European, and three Asian): Signatories to the
recent International Lunar Exploration
Agreement in 2008.
Fourteen countries (two North American, three
Asian, six European, two CIS, and Australia):
Signatories to The Global Exploration Strategy
Framework, released in 2008.
• Eight countries (Asiatic): Per Ref. 10, "In
October 2005, the representatives of China,
Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran ., Mongolia, Pakistan,
Peru and Thailand signed the Asia-Pacific Space
Cooperation Organization (APSCO) Convention
in Beijing,
 and in June 2006 Turkey signed the
Convention as well."
The examples are not intended to be
comprehensive; they simply illustrate a variety of
goals, objectives, participants, and interests--whether
the goal is to deliver hardware to orbit or to co-
develop policies and plans. It is possible to take this
discussion much further, by analyzing the entire set
of known transnational collaborative agreements in
terms of their strengths/'weaknesses and
technical/financial and strategic/tactical aspects. This
is reserved for follow-up work to possibly
prognosticate and/or propose the shape of future
global space partnerships.
A recent workshop convened several
national experts to further delve into space
21cooperation and competition. Participants included
government, academia, and industry representatives
attached to or invited by the National Research
Council. Special attention was given to governmental
space cooperation and competition during and after
the cold war and the lessons learned from that
history. A discussion by Launius concludes that
"...cooperative space endeavors have been richly
rewarding and overwhelmingly useful..." amidst the
many technical, management, and political
2 1.	 Section	 I	 Keynotechallenges that were faced.
Additionally, it was pointed out that 50 years of
valuable experience in conducting global space
cooperation has accrued to serve as a strong
foundation for further ventures.
V. CONCLUSION
The socio-techno-political climate for an
exponentially expanding global and industrial space
11
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age may depend first upon the national strategic and
economic interests of prospective participants.
Fortunately, the enabling technological infrastructure
for future collaboration appears to be maturing
rapidly and strengthening in this early part of the
twenty-first century. At least eight countries provide
ETO space launch capability and/or satellite
manufacturing capability to payload customers,
through either government-sponsored missions or
privately marketed launch services. The community
of scientific and business payload/spacecraft
developers is, therefore, likely to be well served in
the foreseeable future.
More ambitious and long-term endeavors for
both robotic and human space flight will rest on
government resources, yet here too, there appear to
be more options for government customers in terms
of suitable launch vehicles and launch sites around
the world. National governments and their respective
space agencies are making concerted efforts to
leverage global experience and knowledge in
exploring space and exploiting technology to serve
their constituent's needs on Earth. Many open forums
and conferences now exist to facilitate these efforts
through technical interchange and frequently lead to
business relationships thereafter.
Further examination of the space services
marketplace (access and utilization) is possible in
terms of the success and failure of cooperatives, the
pace of development of new space access capability
(either private or governmental), or the operations
and sustainment of such capability, where multiple
geographically-dispersed parties are involved. The
maturation of the space sector is occurring at a rapid
pace with the many actors now involved.
In closing, the following phrase from a 2008
commentary essay in a U.S. trade publication says it
well: `...there is no doubt that the
internationalization of space is enjoying a period of
ascendancy." 22
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